Commonly depicted as one of the final frontiers, Mongolia has gained international notoriety since the turn of the millennium for the discovery of an extensive mineral resource base, estimated to hold over U
Introduction: Oyu Tolgoi, Mongolia's National Development Strategy and the Resource Trap Thesis
Mongolia is the least densely populated country in the world; 2.7 million people live in a landlocked land mass approximately the size of Western Europe, almost 1.6 million square kilometres. In the early 1990s, Mongolia experienced a remarkable post-communist transformation with the collapse of the Soviet Union. While space constrains a full discussion of the particularities of Mongolia's transformation in the wake of the crumbling Soviet Union, scholars at the time observed with fascination its remarkable "success" in adopting the full range of reforms for democratisation and marketisation required by the country's acceptance of financial assistance from international financial institutions (IFIs). Though there is not space to do so here, scholars have gone to great effort to understand this surprising 1 (Anderson et. al, 2000; Kopstein and Reilly, 2000; Fish, 1998; Fish, 2001; Fritz, 2008) embrace of market democracy, analysing the manner and circumstances in which the traits of liberal market democracies -multi-party elections (Bayantur, 2008; Rossabi, 2005) , high rates of public participation in political processes (Sabloff, 2002; Sumaadii, 2012 ) the separation of powers (Ginsberg, 2003) , a written constitution (Sanders, 1992; Fish, 1996; Bedeski, 2006) , human rights commitments (Landman et. al, 2005) , privatisation (Korsun and Murrell, 1995) , financial and trade liberalisation (Pomfret, 2000; Rossabi, 2005) , and an active civil society (Bedeski, 2006 ) -have come to characterise Mongolia. While some aspects of reform were implemented more thoroughly than others (Anderson et al., 2000 ), Mongolia's transition has been widely perceived as an authentic process of democratisation and marketisation (Pomfret, 2000; Fritz, 2008) in contrast to its Central Asian neighbours who have settled in the 'foggy zone' (Schedler, 2002 : 37 quoted in Bayantur, 2008 Kopstein and Reilly, 2000) as post-Soviet autocracies, exhibiting the qualities of neither socialist authoritarianism nor capitalist democracy as classically defined.
One of the less successful -some would say catastrophic (Rossabi, 2005) -aspects of Mongolia's transformation in the 1990s was the sharp decline in living standards: over a third of the population experienced a sudden plunge into abject poverty (Rossabi, 2005; Nixson and Walters, 2006; Sneath, 2003; UNDP, 2000; World Bank, 2006) . Unfortunately, there has been no significant transformation in this area; a recent UNDP Human Development Report (2013: 5) states that 'the intensity of deprivation -that is, the average percentage of deprivation experienced by people living in multi-dimensional poverty -in Mongolia was 41%.' While Mongolia has never been considered a wealthy country, the communist government provided a strong safety net and high levels of education (Rossabi, 2005) ; social welfare comprised 40%
of the communist government's expenditure (ADB, 2008) and universal literacy had been achieved by the late 1980s. The economic shock of the collapsing Soviet Union and the sudden introduction of structural adjustment policies in the early 1990s through 'shock therapy' (Sachs, 1994; Klein, 2007) meant that real expenditure on health and education was reduced by 46% and 56% between 1990 46% and 56% between and 1992 46% and 56% between (Sneath, 2006 ) and unemployment rose from 1. 3% in 1989 to 20% in 1994 (World Bank, 1996 Rossabi, 2005) . These statistics are really only scratching the surface in terms of indicating the social and economic upheaval experienced by Mongolians during the early 1990s, and in fact probably obscure the actual extent of change in social reality (Rossabi, 2005; Sneath, 2003) . For example, the fact that 80%
of the population are recorded as employed obscures the reality that the rural population doubled between 1990 and 1997 to comprise over a third of the total population and half of the working population as many urban Mongolians returned to herding to find subsistence in a contracting economy (Mearns, 2004) . Thus, while the working population was recorded at 80%, half of this number was comprised of new herders seeking subsistence, which was a risky and precarious mode of employment in the transition years given the extensive deregulation of the pastoral economy (Mearns, 2004; Sneath, 2003; Upton 2010; Upton 2012) . 2 Mongolia emerged from the 1990s with a highly liberalised, investment-oriented economy, a narrow industrial base and a scaled-back, uneven welfare distribution system (Nixson and Walters, 2006 (Tumenbayer, 2002) .
Consequently, from the perspective of the Mongolian government, the 2001 discovery of the extensive Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold deposits in the southern Gobi region signified a turning point in terms of the country's role in the global economy in finding a natural resource base and, critically, an opportunity to finally shake the poverty that had shadowed the 1990s. In addition to the 2001 Southern Oyu discovery, three additional deposits were discovered (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) ) which comprise the current Oyu Tolgoi mining complex Kohn and Humber, 2013) . In addition to immense gold deposits, 3 Oyu Tolgoi is now estimated to contain 46 billion pounds of copper, with additional inferred sources estimated at 55 billion pounds (Turquoise Hill Resource, 2013) . The impact of the investment from the Oyu Tolgoi exploration was swift: the mineral sector's share of GDP grew from 10% in to 33% in 2007 (Combellick-Bidney, 2012 . While it was no surprise that Mongolia had vast copper and gold reserves (Dierkes, 2012) , the concentration of this mineral wealth within one mining area and under the auspices of one licensed company suggests that Oyu Tolgoi marked a turning point for Mongolia in terms of engaging with large-scale, long-term foreign investment (Macnamara, 2012 in the first phase of construction . The operational life of the mine is projected to be at least 59 years (Fisher et al., 2011: 20) , which has the potential to dramatically affect (Mongolia, 2007) . The language of the NDS, however, does not simply reflect the rhetoric of the international MDG development agenda;
3 Oyu Tolgoi is estimated to contain 25 million ounces of gold in measured and indicated sources, and a further 37 million ounces in inferred sources. See Turquoise Hill Resources, 2013. its vision is linked from the outset of the document to the increased capacity of the Mongolian economy in light of 'mineral deposits of strategic importance,' (Mongolia, 2007: 5) a catchphrase associated with the discovery of Oyu Tolgoi. The NDS contains a clear policy shift with specific development targets to undergird these heightened aspirations, evidently based on optimistic forecasts for economic performance.
For example, the first and second priority areas (Mongolia, 2007: 5) While the NDS suggests an optimistic sense of the development opportunity of mineral exploitation for Mongolia, the priorities placed upon economic diversification and effective distribution also suggests that Mongolia's leaders recognised the serious risks associated with development strategies based on mineral extraction.
The "resource trap" is a widely recognised thesis in development literature that problematises the puzzle of 'skewed economies' and public impoverishment in many countries with extensive natural wealth (Collier, 2007; Humphreys et al., 2007; Auty, 2000; Auty, 2001; Bebbington et al., 2008; Rosser, 2006) . The signs of a country at risk of a resource trap are exhibited in an impeded inability, known as Dutch Disease, to invest in other economic sectors beyond primary extraction, particularly in value-adding secondary sectors such as manufacturing or processing (Humphreys et al., 2007) . The risk of overspecializing in one industry or commodity sector at the expense of others is heightened because the quantity of resource revenues combined with the timing of the earnings can lead to income volatility (Humphreys et al., 2007: 6) . Income volatility, according to Humphreys et. al (2007: 6) , is due to three distinct problems associated with extractive industries: 'the variation over time in rates of extraction, the variability in the timing of payments by corporations to states, and fluctuations in the value of the natural resource produced.' The national income volatility that results from impeded diversification tends to have a correlative impact on distribution. As Bebbington et al. (2008: 888) (Auty and de Soysa, 2005) . However, the distribution of wealth is not simply a question of corruption. It is difficult for governments, particularly those laden with debt, to make long-term human development or welfare commitments because of the boom-and-bust cycle of commodity value and income (Humphreys et al., 2007: 8; Frankel, 2010) . The revenues gained from "boom" periods often disappear in the short-term to finance the "bust" phase of the cycle, particularly in cases where further debt obligations are incurred on expenditures made in the boom phase (Frankel, 2010) . This vicious cycle has been shown to lead to declining social spending and rising inequality with a knock-on impact on democracy, as the inability of the state to fulfil its promises tends to erode public trust in the efficacy of government (Stiglitz, 2007; Auty and de Soysa, 2005) .
The author will use the resource trap thesis as the starting point for the following analysis because it highlights the tension between opportunity and risk underlying any economic development strategy based on mineral extraction. The macroeconomic challenges of diversification and distribution, then, can be appropriately understood within the particulars of the Mongolian context. The author hopes that this piece will aid in the illumination of Mongolia's governance of Oyu Tolgoi, considering both the government's commitments to its public and the role of international finance and investment into the project.
2. The Discovery of Oyu Tolgoi: "Deposits of Strategic Interest" and Reform of the 1997
Minerals Law
The Oyu Tolgoi deposits were discovered under the provisions of the 1997 Minerals Law, which incentivised foreign direct investment (FDI) into Mongolia's mining sector by establishing low barriers to prospecting, exploring and mining for minerals (Tumenbayer, 2002: 5; World Bank, 2005; Sukhbaatar, 2012: 139 and 2006' as a direct result of Mongolia's legal framework which was apparently almost on par with 'international best practice,' with favourable tax and royalty rates. It guaranteed the investing company a stability agreement with the government so that changes in national law regarding tax rates or royalty regimes would not affect their investment (Sukhbaatar, 2012: 139) . Additionally, the 1997 Minerals Law stipulated that the state could not participate directly as a stakeholder in mining or exploration. The license-holder had many rights and few obligations: it had the right to gain any number of further licenses, sell its products at international prices on both domestic and international markets, as well as having "right of way" through adjacent land in use or owned by others (1997 Minerals Law, Articles 13 and 16).
Proponents of FDI-lead economic development strongly suggest that the benefits of Oyu shifts in legal regulation which preceded the introduction of the ambitious NDS in 2007. Rather than relying on a relatively unregulated market economy to spontaneously catalyse economic development, the NDS articulates an aspiration for a more rigorous regulatory framework for large-scale mining investment in order to capture the most revenue for Mongolia to diversify its economy, increase welfare expenditure and repay the high level of national debt (Mongolia, 2007) .
While these changes received support from Mongolian citizens and civil society, , investors and the broader financial community strongly criticised these legislative manoeuvres as indicative of a trend towards resource nationalism (Packard and Khurelbold, 2010 (Sukhbaatar, 2012; Macnamara, 2012) . In particular, the Windfall Profits Tax was seen to undermine the stability of the rule of law in Mongolia (Sukhbaatar, 2012) . This perspective reflects a particular liberal conception of the rule of law (Jayasuriya, 1999: 2) where the strengthening of the rule of law is correlated with the 'weakening of governmental or public power.' Despite heated opinions on both sides on the controversial Windfall Profits Tax, Sukhbaatar (2012: 142) argues that 'it is difficult to pass judgment on the tax law,' given that the requirements of the rule of law -ie, generality, public knowledge, prospective application -were fulfilled and Mongolia was technically using its sovereign prerogative to determine its taxation framework, a view that was affirmed in a United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration tribunal between a Russian mining company and Mongolia (Usoskin, 2011) . Sukhbaatar critically notes that the point of contention lies in the policy, rather than legal, perspective: 'Mongolia may have hurt its reputation among foreign investors by succumbing to short-term gains from temporary commodity price increases' (Sukhbaatar, 2012: 142) . The revised Minerals Law passed in July 2006 was less controversial, particularly from the view of investors, because it still provided a long-term, stable framework for investment agreements despite reneging on some of the more liberal provisions of the 1997 law (Sukhbaatar, 2012 Campi, 2012) . It was primarily designed as an ongoing 'cash transfer mechanism,' (Campi 2012; Moran, 2013) in addition to funding education initiatives and social services. According to Campi (2013) , the HDF was a legal milestone for the Mongolian public, as it enshrined 'equal eligibility' for each citizen to share in the country's mineral wealth.
To generate savings and prevent reliance on volatile mineral prices, the Mongolian Parliament passed the Fiscal Stability Law in 2010 and the Integrated Budget Law in 2011 (World Bank Group Mongolia, 2013; Isakova et al., 2012) . These laws have the combined effect of capping the deficit and public debt at 2% and 40% of GDP respectively, keeping expenditure in line with the growth rate of Mongolia's non-mineral GDP, and constraining the power of parliament to influence the state budget (Ognon, 2013) . Notably, the 40% cap on public debt only starts in 2014 (Ognon, 2013) . According to an EBRD working paper, the Fiscal Stability Law crucially included the introduction of a 'transparent formula for copper price projections' (Isakova et al., 2012: 15) to accumulate 'excess commodity-related revenues' (Isakova et al., 2012 ) from boom phases in order to supplement financial losses experienced in bust phases of the cycle.
In its recommendations to Mongolia, the EBRD (Isakova et al., 2012: 15) has strongly advised that fiscal frameworks designed to capture maximum revenue from natural resource exploitation are 'arguably the most critical weapon' to defend against the resource trap. The passing of budgetary and fiscal laws in conjunction with establishment of the Human Development Fund and the Fiscal Stability Fund suggests that the Mongolian government is serious in taking the institutional and legal steps necessary to side-step a resource trap, following the general consensus that institutional strength is key to its prevention (Humphreys et al, 2007; Stiglitz, 2007; IMF, 2012; World Bank Group Mongolia, 2013) . However, one of the less understood complexities of the OTIA is that the Mongolian government is actually required to finance its 34% stake in the mine (White, 2013) , taking financial responsibility alongside Turquoise Hill Resources and Rio Tinto for all expenditures.
If it is unable to invest its own capital, the Mongolian government has the "flexibility" to fund its equity share by accepting a loan from the private stakeholders (White, 2013) . However, there is a catch: as a common -vs. preferred -stakeholder, the Mongolian government has to settle its debt obligations before it can recoup profits. 7 Mongolia accepted a loan from Rio Tinto, expecting dividends from the mine to begin in 2019 in addition to royalty and taxation revenue in the meantime (Zand, 2013) .
Given these financial obligations, the Mongolian government expressed deep concern in 2013 over the alleged U.S. $2 billion in cost overruns incurred by Rio Tinto (Riseborough and Kohn, 2013) , which threatens to seriously delay the expected flow of dividends from the mine. A recent article quoted the Head of Planning at the Mining Ministry as estimating that it will be twenty or thirty years before Mongolia shares the profits of Oyu Tolgoi (Zand, 2013 ; see also Kohn and Mellor, 2013) . The Mongolian government halted the first shipments of copper in June 2013 over its '22 Points of Dispute' (Els, 2013) with Rio Tinto; the World Bank has 7 As Rio Tinto holds the principal share of Oyu Tolgoi, it acts as a preferred stakeholder; Turquoise Hill Resources and the Mongolian Government are required to settle their debt obligations before recouping profits as common stakeholders (White, 2013) .
advised that any further delays will have 'significant adverse impacts' (World Bank GroupMongolia, 2013: 8) on Mongolia's foreseeable economic growth. Also of concern to the government is the U.S. $5.1 billion financing package required for the second phase of mine construction (Riseborough and Kohn, 2013) , where 80% of the mineral resource lies . These concerns regarding cost over-runs and further financing pose substantial challenges for Mongolia's budget and debt burden, and crucially, the viability of its fiscal stabilisation framework designed to capture revenue for diversification and distribution.
The little-known complexity of Mongolia's financing obligations has the potential to In 2011, the Mongolian government established the DBM through law 'with a mandate to finance development projects' (Isakova et al., 2012: 9) . Parallel to the establishment of the fiscal stabilisation fund designed to store savings, the Mongolian government acquired significant debt through the DBM; the interest on these bonds was U.S. $15 million in 2012
alone. The EBRD has cautioned the government to clarify the relationship between the MDB and the fiscal stability framework: it 'creates an effective loophole...
[that] allows the government to build up contingent liabilities that could offset accumulation of the FSF' (Isakova et al., 2012: 9) . These concerns have not been addressed and the government has continued to acquire more debt through innovative means, as concessional loans from international donor agencies are being gradually phased out. It seems that Mongolia's fiscal stabilisation framework, despite looking quite effective on paper, is impaired in practice because it goes against the grain of the OTIA incentive structure.
In order for Mongolia to reap dividends from Oyu Tolgoi, both infrastructure investment and debt repayment are necessary. Given Mongolia's debt obligations, this two-fold requirement begs the question as to whether stronger fiscal management is powerful enough for Mongolia to realise the profits of its 34% equity share, even in the long-term. Tolgoi this is not necessarily a sign that the government does not take the rule of law seriously, remembering Jayasuriya's problematisation of narrow definitions of the rule of law which insist on a negative relationship between the rule of law and governmental regulation (Jayasuriya, 1999) .
Another way of framing the issue is to appreciate that the original 1997 Minerals Law reflected the neoliberal legal imagination of Mongolia's post-communist transition (Rossabi, 2005; Ohnesorge, 2007; Bridge, 2004: 407) . The inter-connected convergence of the disintegration of the Soviet Union with the Washington Consensus led to an 'energetic neoliberalism' (Ohnesorge, 2007: 243) , which inspired a 'substantive concern for free markets and limited government' (Ohnesorge, 2007: 244) among policy advisors to countries emerging out of communism. This substantive 12 turn is characterised by the need 'to provide clear, predictable "rules of the game" within which private economic activity [could] take place' (Ohnesorge, 2007: 247) . As Sneath (2003: 441-442) argues, this was perceived by transition advisors as critical to '"emancipate the economy from the political structure, and allow it to assume its latent "natural" form, composed of private property and the market.' This approach has been rigorously critiqued since the end of the 1990s for ignoring the social impact of economic reforms in terms of poverty and the role of effective government regulation in preventing economic exploitation (Fritz, 2002: 75-76; Rossabi, 2005; Nixson and Walters, 2006; UNDP, 2000; IMF, 2003) . The recognised risks of a resource trap, the known dangers of corporate exploitation of developing countries' natural resources and the established necessity of accumulating and using resource revenues for diversification and distribution all suggest that it is possible that Mongolia's "re-regulation" of its mining sector following the discovery of Furthermore, while "resource nationalism" suggests misplaced government priorities, the willingness of the government to risk renegotiation of the OTIA and foreign direct investment could also be conceived as reflecting genuine responsiveness to the concerns of its domestic constituency. Mongolian NGOs, such as Oyu Tolgoi Watch, have urged the government to regain 'balance' (Dugersuren, Mongolian Mining Journal, 2012) , arguing that the OTIA is in favour of the foreign investor's interests. Campi (2012) argues that 'all stakeholders, including the countryside and urban poor, have actively expressed their opinions via workshops, community groups, environmental protests, and in the vibrant Mongolian press.' While there is evidence that political parties have used the redistribution of mineral rents to court the public vote (IMF, 2012: 16) Thus it is worth noting that while populist electoral politics have been widely critiqued (IMF, 2013; Thomson Reuters, 2011; Walker, 2013; Gillies, 2010) is not subject to approval requirements in what were previously considered nationally strategic areas under SEFIL; only foreign companies that are over 50% state-owned and investing at least 33% into minerals, communication or financial sectors -the former 'strategic' sectors -must go through a government approval process (Hogan Lovells, 2013) . The 2013 revisions to the Foreign Investment Law, which require a two thirds majority in parliament to overturn, are obviously intended to return confidence and stability to Mongolia's investment climate (Diana, 2013; Hogan Lovells, 2013; . The scope of the revisions and the associated scrapping of SEFIL reflect an underlying economic need to reassure investors that laws governing investment will be protected to a greater extent from domestic politics.
Concluding Thoughts
This article has purposed to introduce the dilemma and opportunity of Oyu Tolgoi considering the political balancing act of development priorities and foreign direct investment which the Mongolian government has to navigate. Unfortunately, this is no playground see-saw in light of the real risks of a resource trap. Sustained investment in infrastructure, the expansion of secondary economic industry such as manufacturing and the equitable distribution of mineral wealth remain critical to avoiding the skewing effects of mineral dependence on economic diversification and equitable distribution. While Rio Tinto maintains that the project will be profitable in the long-run (Kohn, 2012) , there are basic but lingering questions as to who will profit the most, when Mongolia can expect to make substantial profits and how much these 
